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CURRENT LEGISLATION
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 27-VALIDITY OF BEQUEST TO SUBSCRIBING WITNEss.-Under common law, a will was void where a
subscribing witness was a legatee and the will could not be probated
without his testimony.1 Naturally, great hardship resulted from this
strict rule. Relief from this hardship was obtained through statutory
enactment, which deprived the witness of his interest, thus making
him competent to testify and the Will good.2 But although such provision allowed the will to be probated, the subscribing witness, who
was a legatee, was in no better position than he was before. Subsequent legislation added a saving clause to the statute by providing for
those who would have 3been entitled to an intestate share of the estate,
had there been no will.
By its express words, the statute makes void a bequest to a subscribing witness where such will could not be proved without this
testimony.4 By judicial decisions, it was determined that the statute
would not apply where there were three subscribing witnesses who
were legatees. In such a case, the testimony of only two being necessary to prove the will, the legacy would be saved to the third witness. 5 Furthermore, a legacy to a subscribing witness would not be
void, even though he testified, if the will was provable without his
testimony. 6
In 1941, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which made it
quite apparent that the statute was not so effective as it might be.1
In the case noted, a testatrix bequeathed a business to her employees.
Both of the subscribing witnesses to the will were employees. Thereafter, one of the witnesses left this state and resided in another until
after the will had been admitted to probate. There is no doubt that
1Inre Smith's Estate, 165 Misc. 36, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1937) ; Matter
of Dwyer, 192 App. Div. 72, 182 N. Y. Supp. 64 (4th Dep't 1920).
2 2 R. S. p. 65, § 50.
3 DEc. EsT. LAW § 27. "...
But if such witness would have been entitled
to any share of the testator's estate, in case the will was not established, then
so much of the share that would have descended, or have been distributed to
such witness, shall be saved to him, as will not exceed the value of the devise
or bequest made to him in the will, and he shall recover the same of the devisees
or legatees named in the will, in proportion to, and out of, the parts devised
and bequeathed to them."
4 DEC. EsT. LAW § 27. "If any person shall be a subscribing witness to
the execution of any will, wherein any beneficial devise, legacy, interest or
appointment of any real or personal estate shall be made to such witness, and
such will cannot be proved without the testimony of such witness, the said
devise, legacy, interest or appointment shall be void, so far only as concerns
such witness, or any claiming under him; and such person shall be a competent
witness, and compellable to testify respecting the execution of said will, in like
manner as if no such devise or bequest had been made. .. "
5 it re Tactkian's Estate, 109 Misc. 519, 179 N. Y. Supp. 188 (1919);
In re Owen, 48 App. Div. 507, 62 N. Y. Supp. 919 (2d Dep't 1900).
6ln re Owen, 48 App. Div. 507, 62 N. Y. Supp. 919 (2d Dep't 1900).
7 Matter of Walters, 285 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E. (2d) 72 (1941).
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her purpose in leaving the state was to avoid testifying and to save
the legacy to herself. The will was admitted to probate on the testimony of one witness, testimony
of the other having been dispensed
8
with as provided by law.
The argument of the witness seeking her legacy, was that since
the will actually was admitted to probate without her testimony, it
cannot be said that the will could not have been admitted without her
testimony. Thus, the bequest to this witness should be upheld. Surprisingly enough, the Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the
Surrogate Court and the Appellate Division on that point, and held
the devise to said witness to be good.9
The trouble with this reasoning is that it tests the validity of the
legacy by what actually did happen, rather than by what might have
happened. The dissenting opinion points out, that since, when first
offered, the will could not have been probated without the testimony
of the two witnesses (both were then present in the state), the legacy
to both was void. Such void legacy could not become validated by
the subsequent act of the witness in leaving the state. 10
The unfairness of the majority opinion is manifest. Under this
decision, one witness profits by acts which were performed with a
view toward evading the ordinary process of the law. On the other
hand, the witness who has aided the administration of justice, must
pay the price of his legacy. The net result is that one who is so fortunate as to have money and time enough to enable him to absent
himself from the state until the need for his presence is gone, reaps a
benefit.
Such a situation does not appeal to any sense of justice. The
legislature, however, was not long in coming forth with a remedy.
This year, the statute was amended by inserting a new second paragraph. 1 The statute now provides that a legacy to a subscribing
witness shall be void unless there are two other subscribing witnesses
to the will who are not beneficiaries thereunder. 12
Although there are, as yet, no judicial decisions applying the
amended statute, there would seem to be little room for doubt. The
statute was designed to prevent the situation involved in Matter of
8 SUR. CT. Act § 142. This section provides that whenever, by reason of
death, absence from state, or incompetency, the testimony of a subscribing
witness cannot be obtained, the surrogate may dispense with such testimony and
the will may be admitted to probate on the testimony of one subscribing witness.
9 See note 7, supra.
10 See DESOND, J., dissenting in Matter of Walters, 285 N. Y. 158, 33
N. E. (2d) 72 (1941), at 163.
11 N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 622.
12 DEc. EsT. LAw § 27. ". . . Except as hereinafter provided in this section no subscribing witness to a will shall be entitled to receive any beneficial
devise, legacy, interest or appointment of any real or personal estate thereunder
unless there are two other subscribing witnesses to the will who are not benefldaries thereunder. . . ." (Italics mine.)
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Walters, discussed above, from ever arising again. 13 The statute, as
it now stands, also embraces a case where there are three subscribing
witnesses who are legatees. Even in such a case, a witness would not
be protected, for the statute demands two other subscribing witnesses
who are not beneficiaries. The statute aims to provide equal treatment of all legatee-witnesses and its language seems clear enough to
effect its purpose.
CATHERINE MCCARTHY.

ACTIONS

To BE COMMENCED WITHIN SIX YEARS

A legislative nwte on the present statute of the period of limitations in
stockholder's derivative actions
A recently passed amendment concerning the rights of stockholders in derivative actions has thrown an entirely new light on what was
heretofore a confused, ambiguous and indiscernible rule. This statute, a section of the Civil Practice Act, provides for a clear and satisfactory method of computing the time within which derivative actions
may be brought under varying facts.' To better appreciate and understand the significance of this new rule let us briefly examine the
earlier situation. Formerly, in determining the period of limitation
several theories were advanced. The earliest and most adhered to
was the trust or equitable theory, wherein the action was brought by
the stockholder as trustor against the directors as trustees of the corporate property. In Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick 2 it was held that the
director was the "guardian" of the corporate property and answerable
and responsible to the stockholders for any misconduct. All trust
13Note of Commission, McKINNEY, DEc. EsT. LAW (1942)
Supp. 49.
". The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the circumvention of the
statute in the manner outlined in Matter of Walters (285 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E.
[2d] 72) ...."

'Section 48 (subd. 8, added by L. 1942, c. 851, in effect Sept. 1) : "Actions
to be commenced within six years. The following actions must be commenced
within six years after the cause of action has accrued ...
"Subd. 8. An action legal or equitable, by or on behalf of a corporation against a director, officer, or stockholder, or a former director,
officer, or stockholder, if such action is for an accounting, or to procure
judgment on the ground of fraud, or to recover a penalty or forfeiture
imposed or to enforce a liability created by common law or by statute
unless such action is one to recover damages for waste or for an injury
to property or for an accounting in connection therewith in which case
such action shall be subject to the 1rovisions of subdivision seven of
section forty-nine."
2 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663 (1885).

